The special concept of trust does not provide a distinct justification for mandatory legal rules. A lthough regulation might lead parties to decide to rely on others, it does not produce the sort of transaction-cost-reducing "trust" that should matter for public policy --that is, trust based on altruism, norms, personal relationships, and social capital. Moreover, using mandatory rules to increase trust may have precisely the opposite effect of increasing distrust and undermining trust-creation devices. Thus, trust provides an additional argument in favor of enforcing contracts.
the benefit that would accrue assuming entrustment is warranted. 8 More precisely, reliance can be said to result when the probability-adjusted gain from relying exceeds the probability-adjusted loss from the breach by the one who is relied on --that is, if PG x G > PL x L. 9 One who leaves his car keys with a parking attendant expects to gain from placing the car under someone's protection rather than exposing it to the hazards of the street, and from saving the costs of searching for and walking to and from the self-parked space. The car owner's anticipated losses include the attendant's stealing the car, banging it up or stripping the gears. Even a somewhat unreliable attendant may produce anticipated gains if, for example, there is a high probability of theft off the street.
Trust also can be viewed in the special sense of reliance on one who is not subject to costly constraints and irrespective of the risk of breach. Thus, Luhmann at one point describes trust as a kind of "suspension of external refutation" that ignores the risk of disappointment. 10 Trust in this sense permits interaction with lower transaction costs. Law clearly can produce a decision to rely by enforcing contracts or imposing mandatory constraints that affect the parties' risk calculation. This article shows, however, that law cannot produce trust.
The decision to rely obviously relates to what is generally referred to as "trustworthiness," or the likelihood that the person relied on will honor his promise. 11 Like one who trusts, the one who is trustworthy in the sense discussed in this article behaves non-calculatively and honors his promise even in the absence of constraints such as repeat dealings. 12 Trustworthiness, like trust, has the welfare-increasing attribute of reducing transaction costs. Although both concepts refer to non-calculative, potentially welfare-increasing, behavior, they a re not necessarily reciprocal. One may trust another who is behaving calculatively, or rely in the calculative sense on a non-calculative, or "trustworthy," person. 13 Barney & Hansen's distinction between "weak form," "semi-strong form" and "strong form" trust 14 captures these views of trust by differentiating the decision to rely according to the parties' vulnerability to the risk of disappointment. Strong-form, or "principled," trust arises, in Barney & Hansen's view, even where the trustor is technically f ree to breach but "opportunistic behavior would violate values, principles, and standards of behavior that have been internalized by parties to an exchange." 15 Trust in this form, which is the focus of the article, arises only when the trustee is not bound by external constraints to honor his promise. 16 By contrast, semi-strong-form trust arises where the trustor is protected by structures the parties have set up but is still vulnerable to the risk of disappointment if those structures prove inadequate. 17 What Barney & Hansen call weak-form "trust" exposes the relying party to very little risk because of legal or other constraints on the other's conduct. 18 Similarly, Luhmann ascribes important functions to law and institutions in producing "trust," mostly by r educing the need for information about the promisor's reliability. 19 However, because this decision to rely involves none of the vulnerability this article associates with trust, it will be referred to here as weak-form "reliance."
These categories are useful in connecting concepts of trust with social welfare. Trust theorists assert that trust in the sense of willingness to be vulnerable to another improves social welfare by reducing friction in society. 20 The corollary is that the law should encourage this type of trust. 21 This includes not only strong-form trust, but also semi-strong-form trust arising from incomplete external constraints that leave enough vulnerability for trust to develop. As discussed below in Part III, the trade-off for this vulnerability is the sort of reduced friction or transaction costs that is attributed to trust.
This social welfare analysis, in turn, helps evaluate the role of law. As discussed below in Part II, law is irrelevant to the socially valuable, or strong-form, trust. Although law does relate to semi-strong-form trust and weak-form reliance in the sense of providing constraints that produce reliance, "trust" theories add nothing to the standard law-and-economics analysis of whether these legal constraints are socially valuable in reducing transaction costs. 22 In short, "trust" provides no distinct rationale for law.
II. LAW AND STRONG-FORM TRUST
As discussed in Part I, any useful trust-based theory of law must relate to trust in the distinct sense of an inherent tendency to cooperate. This Part analyzes various theories of strong-form trust and shows that law is irrelevant to all of these theories. Section A discusses trust that arises because of the parties' disposition to trust or be trustworthy. Section B discusses trust that arises in personal relationships. Section C discusses self-enforcing norms of trust and trustworthiness. Section D discusses trust that is associated with what has been called "social capital."
A. DISPOSITION TO TRUST
Some people are more d isposed to trust and be trustworthy than others. The inherently trusting person may place trust without regard to whether PG x G > PL x L. The trustworthy person performs a promise even if the expense of doing so is not balanced by the gains, such as developing a reputation for trustworthiness. Thus, Diego Gambetta, after asking whether trust is simply "a result of cooperation otherwise secured" by devices such as coercion and pre-commitment, 23 concludes that the evolution of cooperation depends on a "disposition toward conditional trust," 24 or a willingness to believe in trustworthiness. 25 This disposition is important because information about reliability may be hard to get. 26 Distrust may be hard to invalidate through experience and deters the additional dealings that would provide the necessary information. 27 Although Gambetta concludes that it is therefore "rational to trust trust and distrust distrust," 28 he does not clarify why individuals will end up acting in a socially rational way. Thus, Gambetta's view reduces to the simple fact that some people start with a disposition to trust. 29 The disposition to trust may be difficult to identify in practice because it results from an unobservable decision-making process rather than an observable outcome. It may be unclear whether the trustor was willing to ignore possible negative outcomes or viewed the costs of placing trust as outweighed by probability-discounted gains (i.e., PG > PL). The two may merge where one becomes disposed to trust because of favorable prior experiences. 30 The disposition to trust or be trustworthy arguably resembles altruism, since the trustor and trustee confer a benefit on society by increasing the amount of trust. 31 By contrast, weak and semi-strong forms of trust involve a reasonable expectation of gain, and the types of strong-form trust discussed below arise because the trustee and trustor face emotional costs from distrust or untrustworthiness or expect reciprocation. It has been said that "a society of self-interest makes trust difficult if not impossible." 32 Because economics is based on a model of rational self-maximization, it seems to follow that trust stands outside of economics. However, the rational choice model of economics does not exclude altruism. As Gary Becker pointed out in his Nobel lecture, his economic approach "assumes that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic." 33 Thus, by trusting we may be increasing our utility. As Becker might say, w e have a "taste" for trust. 34 Moreover, it may be difficult to distinguish altruism from long-run self-interest. For example, Robert Frank notes that emotions such as trustworthiness may serve our long-run self-interest by acting as a commitment device. 35 Whatever its origins, the disposition to trust is one of several factors that together produce the decision to rely. In other words, one disposed to trust would not necessarily ignore costs and benefits, but rather simply would not be rigidly governed by them. One may, for example, choose to pay up to a certain amount for something that, as a practical matter, he may take for free, but over that amount may be overcome by the temptation to cheat. 36 Barney & Hansen observe that even "strong form trustworthy" p eople have a "Faustian" price at which they "will abandon their values, principles and standards of behavior, and act in opportunistic ways." 37
This relationship between the disposition to trust and other reliance-producing conditions is evident in the work of Morton Deutsch. He sees trust as depending on players' attitudes, and presents experimental data supporting this view. 38 People who have a mutually cooperative attitude establish trust even if the immediate situation does not encourage it. 39 More individualistically inclined people respond more to situational factors in deciding whether to deal with each other. 40 Competitive people are less inclined to be trusting than those who are merely individualistic because the latter are subject to greater social constraints on uncooperative behavior. 41 The disposition to trust is particularly important in long-term open-ended relationships like business firms given the costs of constructing fully effective constraints. Several commentators have proposed theories of trust in firms that rely on workers and managers somehow acquiring dispositions to trust and be trustworthy. For example, Tyler and Degoey show how firms can create a social bond with their workers based on respect, expressions of benevolent motives, and support that encourages people unquestioningly to contribute efforts to the firm. 42 Tyler & Degoey contrast their theory with those emphasizing calculating self-benefits from acting cooperatively. 43 Tyler & DeGoey present data showing that workers respond favorably to employers' assurances rather than to such "instrumental" motives as their dependence on the job. 44 The authors argue that this shows that non-calculative trust is important in commercial as well as personal relationships. 45 Bruce Chapman's theory of trust in firms similarly relies on example concerns Stephen King's decision to make an unencrypted version of part of his book available for downloading for a dollar, paid on the honor system. King observed: "I reserve the right to cease publication if a lot of people steal the story; but I just don't believe that will happen. I mean, we're talking a buck a pop here, right?" King To Follow E-Book Success With Honor-System Experiment, E-Commerce Law Weekly, June 19, 2000, available on http://www.law.com.
managers' dispositions to be trustworthy. 46 Chapman asserts that trust in firms cannot depend on parties' self-interested actions 47 or on managers' reputations. 48 Rather, managers must become trustworthy by seeming to be blindly loyal. 49 Employees will not trust managers as long as the latter seem to be rationally choosing to act, rather than acting out of "what they are." 50 Assuming the validity of these theories, 51 the important question for present purposes concerns the role of law in producing this disposition. Mandatory regulation that forces people to attend to others' interests cannot produce the disposition to trust or be trustworthy. Legal constraints may increase the probability that one will perform as promised, but not one's willingness to perform in the absence of constraints or to make oneself vulnerable to the risk of non-performance. If managers are disposed to be trustworthy and shareholders and workers are disposed to trust then there is no need for law. L aw may dispose one party to rely on another because the other is subject to legal constraints. But this has nothing to do with the distinct concept of trust. Although law may be socially valuable in this sense to the extent that people are not disposed to trust, its justification must be sought other than from theories of trust.
Legal coercion might be said to cause a disposition to trust that is based on one's favorable experiences in relying on others. 52 These experiences might reveal information that favorably bears on the decision to rely, such as peoples' willingness to obey the law even if punishment is not severe and detection is imperfect. But legal coercion subtracts as well as adds information. Even if regulation enables people to learn that others are trustworthy, it also reduces their ability to learn how others will act when they are not 46 subject to legal constraints.
B. PERSONAL TRUST
People may be trusting or trustworthy in specific relationships. Family members or close friends may eschew calculation of probabilities as inconsistent with the intimate bond between them. Oliver Williamson asserts that this form of trust is the only one that is distinct from conventional transaction cost theory. 53 As discussed in this Part, that may not be the case. On the other hand, even parties to personal relationships may only appear to eschew calculation while expecting payoffs in the form of reciprocal behavior from their partners.
For present purposes it is enough to note that regulation cannot produce personal trust. The parties rely on each other because of the underlying legal constraint, not because of any trust-like vulnerability. For example, a husband and wife may believe each other because each knows the other will be subject to legal penalties for lying, but this is not personal trust even if it arises in a personal relationship because the need for costly penalties suggests that trust is unavailable to eliminate friction in the relationship.
A possible argument for law in this context is that, by reducing the risk of relying on others, regulation starts relationships in which trust can eventually develop. This appears to be supported by Lewicki & Bunker's three-stage model of trust. 54 The first stage involves calculation of risk based on such factors as punishment, rewards and reputation. The parties enter the second stage based on knowledge of their past behavior. This stage is less fragile than the first because the parties tend to place deviations from complete trustworthiness in the context of past trustworthiness. In the third stage the parties identify with each other and reach a mutual understanding comparable to personal trust. In this model, regulation might "seed" relationships that ultimately develop into strong-form trust.
The problem with this rationale is that it cannot account for the eventual development of trust in the relationship. In other words, it is not clear why the sorts of relationships that regulation "seeds" are more likely to develop trust than those created without regulation. Indeed, the correlation would seem to be negative since regulationinduced relationships begin in the shadow of coercion. Moreover, as discussed below, 55 regulation may actually frustrate the development of personal trust.
C. NORMS
Trust may a rise from a social norm -that is, a rule that is imposed by social conventions rather than by centralized lawmakers and that is enforced by extralegal sanctions. Under this norm, people operate under an honor system where they make themselves vulnerable t o others and are trustworthy without strictly calculating costs and benefits, including the effects of legal penalties. Acting pursuant to this norm resembles the disposition to trust except that violations are punished by social disapprobation and Assuming mandatory legal rules can have some role in norm-creation generally, they are irrelevant to the trust norm. This norm is based on the trustor's vulnerability, and therefore is fundamentally inconsistent with legal coercion.
The law might help establish a trustworthiness norm, and thereby make promises more reliable. It has been argued that, by penalizing disloyal behavior, the law expresses a social consensus concerning the type of conduct that constitutes cheating, and so concretizes the behavior that invokes emotional sanctions for violating internalized norms against cheating. 68 But there is reason to be skeptical that law can have this effect. 69 Moreover, legal penalties that h elp establish an anti-"cheating" norm might be perverse because the norm would be overbroad and would deter socially beneficial selfish behavior. 70 And even if the law influences the trustworthiness norm, it is not clear that it does so through coercion. Some commentators argue that judges create or strengthen norms of trust through morally-tinged language in judicial opinions. 71 Under this reasoning, fiduciaries could opt out of liability and still be subject to the fiduciary norm defined by judicial language. Thus, judges might issue stern warning tickets but preserve the vulnerability and freedom from coercion that is essential to trust.
Blair and Stout make an alternative argument for the importance of judicial moralizing that emphasizes the role of binding fiduciary rules. 72 They theorize that fiduciary law "frames" corporate managers' roles as either self-interested (low-trust) or other-regarding (high-trust). Judicial language that communicates the fiduciary norm determines the directors' relationship with the firm and thereby defines their supra note 62; Posner, supra note 64. 68 See Eisenberg, supra note 56; Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson: Contract Law and the Economics of Interorganizational Trust, 153-54, in Lane & Bachmann, supra note 51 (arguing that, because regulation may influence the development of trust norms, we should not look merely at law's coercive effect to assess its overall impact). 69 See Market Street Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F. 2d 588, 595 (7 th Cir. 1991)(Posner, J., stating that "[i]t would be quixotic as well as presumptuous for judges to undertake through contract law to raise the ethical standards of the nation's business people"). 70 See Bainbridge, supra note 33 at 867-68 (criticizing as indeterminate proposal for legal enforcement of social norms against cheating). preferences. 73 Blair & Stout argue that, since contract law encourages parties to be selfinterested while fiduciary law encourages them to be other-regarding, a relationship cannot properly be described as both fiduciary and contractual. 74 Allowing corporations to opt out of managerial fiduciary duties would cause managers to slip into a selfinterested stance, leaving firms with managers who are governed neither by external nor internal constraints. 75 Thus, Blair & Stout argue that fiduciary duties, to be effective, must be binding. But Blair & Stout do not show why judicial language concerning fiduciaries' other-regarding nature must be linked with liability in order to define fiduciaries' social roles. Indeed, mandatory liability might be counterproductive by forcing managers to completely opt out of their fiduciary role solely in order to avoid liability. 76 Moreover, as Blair & Stout acknowledge, 77 reciprocity theory suggests that liability may have the opposite effect of discouraging trustworthiness. 78 In short, legal coercion does not help develop norms of trustworthiness or of trust. Moreover, as discussed below, 79 regulation impedes development of trust norms by interfering with opportunities to be genuinely trusting or trustworthy.
D. SOCIAL CAPITAL
"Social capital" is used here to describe the social forces that support decisions to trust without the need to establish costly transaction-specific constraints. James Coleman discusses various sources of social capital, including organizations, 80 business firms, 81 73 Id. at 66, 70-72.
74 Id. at 56-58. Blair & Stout also observe that since "contractarian theory is rooted in economic analysis," and since neoclassical economics treats preferences as given, contractarian theory cannot cause people to adopt a different, other-regarding, preference function. Id. at 58-59. However, the law and economics literature now incorporates a variety of approaches to preferences. More importantly, regardless of how "economic analysis" is construed, the present article shows that it is mandatory regulation, and not private ordering, that is incompatible with theories of trust.
75 Id. at 60-62. 76 See infra text accompanying note 162. 77 See id. at 73-74. 78 See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 79 See infra subpart V(B)(3). 80 See Coleman, supra note 1 at 312-13. For leading works on the role of associations in creating social capital, see Putnam, supra note 84 (concluding that social capital is declining in the U.S. because of reduction in associational activity); Robert D. Putnam, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK (1993) (explaining differences in economic success and government efficacy between northern and southern Italy in terms of associational activity).
81 Id. at 313. trust norms, 82 and ideology, such as religious beliefs that are hospitable to a trusting atmosphere. 83 Some of these sources create what Robert Putnam calls "thick" trust, which is based on specific relationships and expectations of reciprocity, while others create "thin" trust, which is based on the general social fabric. 84 It might be said that social capital exists only in private organizations or small groups. 85 But religious and ethical values may contribute to "spontaneous sociability," or people's willingness to form new associations. 86 This sociability permits trust to spread beyond close-knit family structures or small communities 87 and contributes to the growth of large organizations such as business associations. 88 How might law affect the creation of social capital? One possible story is that legal sanctions for untrustworthy conduct make people more willing to rely on strangers, which increases "sociability." But this just restates the arguments about how legal sanctions dispose people to rely on others by affecting their probability assessments. 89 Trust arises in these settings only in the absence of coercion. We may trust others to some extent because our religion teaches us to do so or because the others are in our groups, but not because we know the others are coerced into being reliable. Law's role, at most, is to pick up where social capital leaves off. But, as shown below, law must be regarded as a substitute for rather than complement of social capital because it undermines the institutions that create it. 90
III. SEMI-STRONG FORM TRUST
The decision to rely occurs in some situations because the parties have voluntarily . 85 See Bainbridge, supra note 1 at 803. Cf. Ellickson, supra note 57 at 177-82 (concluding that welfare-maximizing cooperation norms arise only in "close-knit" groups). 86 See Fukuyama, supra note 1 at 26. See also Francis Fukuyama, THE GREAT DISRUPTION (1999) (noting that trust grows from shared norms of honesty and reciprocity (id. at 51) and discussing the cultural and religious bases of trust (id. at 240-41); Francis Fukuyama (this volume) (noting that social capital is norms and values that promote cooperation and serves as the basis of trust). 87 See Fukuyama, supra note 1. The reliance on families in a low-trust society is humorously illustrated in Ian Fleming's "From Russia with Love," in which a Turkish intelligence agent employs only his many sons. 88 See id. at 36, 47-8; 62-3, 226 (linking growth of industry to trust). 89 See supra text accompanying notes__. 90 See infra subpart VI(B)(4). taken on constraints that assure performance. These may include contractual obligations and incentive devices that align the parties' incentives and interests, or "hostages" that the hostage-giver must forfeit in the event of non-performance. 91 "Semi-strong-form" trust refers here to trust that operates in the vulnerability left by the risk that these privately assumed constraints may prove to be insufficient. 92 By contrast, under weak-form "trust" discussed in the next subpart, the law supplies an additional, uncontracted-for constraint to protect against disappointment. As with other forms of trust, the payoff is reduced transaction costs, in this case from the parties' ability to design constraints to fit their transactions rather than being forced to accept one-size-fits-all mandatory rules.
The constraints associated with semi-strong-form trust include the bonding and monitoring devices discussed in the agency cost literature. 93 A principal will delegate power to an agent when the costs of these constraints, together with expected residual loss, are less than the benefits of delegation. For example, individuals and firms can bond future performance by investing time and money in developing a reputation that would be devalued by acts of disloyalty. 94 The bond is self-enforcing in that misconduct diminishes the value of trustee's reputation according to the public's perception of the seriousness of the conduct. 95 Once reputational or other constraints are in place the parties seem to "trust" each other. However, the investment in reputation, or in detailed contracting until less formal reputational constraints are in place, 96 differentiates these transactions from the frictionless world of strong-form trust. Private constraints may, however, be compatible with trust. As long as people are not completely constrained by law, there is room for vulnerability and therefore trust. To be sure, detailed contracts, like legal regulation, may "crowd out" trust. 103 However, as discussed below, mandatory constraints only exacerbate this problem. 104 Thus, crowding out supports relying on strong-form trust rather than contractual constraints, but not replacing private ordering with mandatory rules.
Semi-strong form trust is particularly important in firms. Shareholders, workers and others who contract in and with the firm may decide to rely on managers because of market and contractual structures that help ensure that managers act in their interests. These include incentive compensation, governance devices such as monitoring boards, shareholder voting, and efficient securities markets. 105 David Kreps' theory of corporate culture 106 is an example of semi-strong-form trust in firms. Kreps notes that firms can post self-enforcing reputational bonds 107 that are valuable because firms last longer than their individual agents and their owners seek to maintain the firm's value to maximize the sale price of their shares. 108 The firm bases its reputation on a "culture" that guides the sorts of transactions the firm is likely to engage in, 109 and that the firm can readily communicate to customers, suppliers, executives and employees. 110 In order to make favorable contracts with workers and others, the firm has an interest in motivating its agents to preserve a culture of trustworthiness. Kreps' theory thus explains corporate "trust" in Williamsonian calculative terms.
Semi-strong-form constraints like that emphasized by Kreps do not provide a distinct rationale for law. The law might reduce the costs of the decision to rely through its well-understood transaction-cost-reducing function --i.e., by providing standard forms and enforcing the parties' contracts. But this does not involve resorting to special concepts of "trust."
To the extent that the decision to rely on private ordering involves the distinct vulnerability associated with trust, law is irrelevant. Shareholders, workers and others may trust in the sense of making themselves vulnerable to the risk of breach o f faith rather than insisting on mandatory backup rules. Trust does not emerge from legal coercion.
IV. WEAK-FORM RELIANCE: LAW INSTEAD OF TRUST
What Barney & Hansen call weak-form "trust" 111 is not "trust" at all in the sense discussed in this article because it wholly replaces vulnerability with constraints. Mandatory legal rules make it easier to rely on promises because they remove any risk of disappointment resulting from limited foresight and knowledge in the ex ante design of constraints. This does not, in itself, justify mandatory rules, however, because it is not self-evident why the law should remove vulnerability rather than simply allowing the parties to take it into account in determining the price. Calling the decision to rely one to "trust" does not change this conclusion.
An example of "trust"-based arguments for mandatory rules is Tamar Frankel's article on the need for regulation to engender trust, focusing on regulation of the financial services industry. 112 Responding to Langbein's theory of trust law as contract, 113 Frankel asserts the need for fiduciary law, 114 saying that, without "a legal infrastructure," markets "cannot exist." 115 Law's "backing" permits the development of a "trusting commons." 116 Contracts alone are insufficient, she says, because they may offer less than absolute firm's culture of trustworthiness because if they confessed to any self-interest employees, communities, and others would tend to over-discount the reliability of the firm's promises. See also Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 9 at [19] (discussing how firms induce trust through such devices as culture and contributions to charity). protection, 117 and thereby indicate that the trustee will be less than fully trustworthy. 118 According to Frankel, if the law does not provide absolute trustworthiness, the parties must rely on detailed contracts, 119 trustors face an "unknowable and unpredictable future," 120 investments will become illiquid because of the risk of runs, 121 and investors "will put their money in gold and other unproductive goods, and hide it under the mattress." 122
This argument assumes that investors will fully understand the uncertainty they face and for that reason will be reluctant to invest. 123 The victims of distrust therefore are not individual investors but rather markets that lose productive investments because of inadequate legal protection. There is a large literature on cross-country comparison of investor protection and implications for designing securities markets in emerging economies. 124 Although market actors have incentives to create and to rely on market intermediaries such as bond rating agencies, their incentives may be suboptimal because individual investors and firms do not capture all of the benefits from improving an entire market. 125 This argument might justify some mandatory laws, assuming the social costs of these laws do not outweigh benefits, including increasing the general level of 117 See id. at 26-7 (asserting that fiduciary duties are based on property rights rather than contract damages); 32 (stating that weaker contract approach encourages mistrust through such rules as efficient breach; no duty to speak, and damages rather than accounting for profits). The important point for present purposes is that a special concept of "trust" does nothing to advance this analysis. On their face the above arguments point to no reason why the law should ensure that investors must be able to rely unhesitatingly on firms. In particular, "trust" does not support more stringent regulation in an already strong securities market such as that in the U.S., particularly in view of the potential trustreduction consequences of such regulation discussed below in Part V. For example, government might induce more people to invest by requiring all issuers to offer moneyback guarantees rather than merely full disclosure, but mandating these guarantees obviously would entail substantial costs, including limiting the range of available investments. "Trust" in this sense is no more than a shorthand for other arguments for regulation. Only trust in the sense discussed in this article deserves special consideration because of its potential for reducing friction in society. Arguments like Frankel's implicitly assume that investors lack trust, so that markets need regulatory "backing." But this approach precludes any opportunity for genuine trust and trustworthiness by ensuring that everybody acts under legal coercion.
This analysis applies to theories of trust within firms that several legal commentators have proposed. Lawrence Mitchell opened this line of analysis by criticizing the fairness test in corporate law, which allows insiders who have participated in conflicting interests transactions to escape liability if they can prove that the transactions were fair. 127 Mitchell suggests requiring the fiduciary at least to obtain the best possible price, and not merely a fair price, in "vertical conflict" situations where the fiduciary's interest competes with those of the firm as a whole. 128 Mitchell sees such strict law as necessary because investors would not "entrust [their] money to people who you were told had the power, p ractical ability, and legal right to take some of it for themselves." 129 Mitchell's later writing criticizes Williamson's calculative trust model because of its emphasis on self-interest. 130 Mitchell asserts that permitting parties to act in their self-interest destroys the "culture" of trust 131 by leading shareholders to be more suspicious of management's motives, and managers therefore to trust shareholders less. 132 If the law instead forces managers to consider shareholders' interests, shareholders will be achieve this result by a dopting a pre-commitment strategy, as by genuinely transforming themselves emotionally as Robert Frank has argued. 144 But it is far from clear how the theories make the leap from there to mandatory legal rules. Rules that punish managers for breaches prevent them from demonstrating their genuine commitment to the workers and innate trustworthiness. Although law may usefully provide a substitute constraint that induces shareholders or workers to rely on managers, this has nothing to do with trust.
The above rationales for trust-based regulation are best understood in light of the corporate "communitarian" theories these writers espouse. 145 These theorists want to remake the corporation by elevating workers' role. 146 Trust would arise after law reshapes the world into a communitarian mold. However, it is not clear why changing the power structure would increase trust in firms. Rather, putting the workers in charge simply creates a new incentive structure with different but equal opportunities for distrust to arise among workers and between workers and managers. 147 The only way mandatory rules might create trust in firms or elsewhere is by changing peoples' preferences. As discussed above, Blair & Stout have argued that law might make people more other-regarding and l ess self-interested, applying their arguments explicitly in the firm context. 148 However, there is little logical and no empirical support for this theory. 149 Indeed, as discussed below, mandatory rules are more likely to move preferences in the opposite direction. 150
V. TRUST-BASED ARGUMENTS AGAINST LAW
The discussion so far indicates that law has nothing to do with trust. This leaves open the possibility that law complements trust in the sense that mandatory legal rules may be necessary to the extent that trust is lacking. But, as this Part discusses, law actually may undermine trust, and therefore serve as a substitute rather than a complement. Subpart A shows that regulation may increase the potential for distrust. 144 See supra text accompanying note 35.
145 Corporate communitarian ideology is perhaps best represented by the collection of essays in Mitchell, supra note 130. 146 
See generally David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in Mitchell, supra note 130. For excellent critiques of communitarianism, see Bainbridge, supra note 1; Bainbridge, supra note 33. Communitarianism looks similar to "team production" theory, which also emphasizes cooperation among corporate factions. However, team production purports to be a description of how firms actually operate and therefore does not in itself seem 147 See Bainbridge, supra note 1. 148 See supra text accompanying note 73. 149 See supra text accompanying notes 76 -78. 150 See infra text accompanying note 165. Subpart B shows how regulation can frustrate the trust-creation mechanisms discussed in Part I, including norms, personal trust, social capital and private associations.
A. REGULATION AND DISTRUST
A broad and strict duty that ignores ex ante expectations in order to protect the parties from ex post disappointment also may give them opportunities to get more than they bargained for. It follows that imposing extra duties to reduce the parties' vulnerability to the risk of disappointment may increase their vulnerability to opportunistic litigation. 151 T his, in turn, increases the need for devices to deal with the new vulnerability. Regulation thereby may increase the friction and attendant transaction costs that trust is supposed to reduce. Some productive transactions might be lost if these devices are not feasible. The following subsections illustrate these effects of regulation.
Managers' fiduciary duties
Imposing broad duties on managers may force them to incur costs to deal with the distrust these duties engender. This was evident when the Delaware supreme court imposed potentially draconian negligence liability on corporate directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 152 Directors had to protect themselves from the risk of being sued for mistakes that previously were not actionable. In other words, directors could not rely on shareholders not to sue for bad results that occurred although directors performed up to shareholders' ex ante expectations. In Van Gorkom's wake, directors' and officers' liability insurance became more costly and less available. 153 Legislators dealt with the problem by enacting statutes authorizing duty of care opt-out charter provisions. 154 These charter clauses, in turn, created extra contracting and litigation costs, such as uncertainties concerning the scope of the opt-out. 155 This indicates what might happen if courts were to impose even stricter duties on managers, as Mitchell suggests. 156
Duties to non-shareholders
Marleen O'Connor's proposal to expand managers' fiduciary responsibilities to 151 See Putnam, supra note 84 at 147 (noting increase in demand for legal work from "preventive lawyering" because informal understandings are no longer sufficient). Another effect of the distrust that fiduciary duties may cause is diverting the parties' efforts from production to monitoring. 158 in which the trial court recognized an implied duty purportedly based on a promise by General Motors to a municipality not to transfer production to another plant seven years after receiving a property tax abatement. The trial court cited the "gross inequity and patent unfairness if General Motors, having lulled the people of the Ypsilanti area into giving up millions of tax dollars which they so desperately need to educate their children and provide basic governmental services, is allowed to simply decide it will desert 4500 workers and their families because it thinks it can make these same cars cheaper somewhere else." 159 Although the appellate court reversed, finding no promise and no reliance, Professor O'Connor agrees with the trial court's basis for imposing liability. 160 The trial court's holding arguably would enable towns in Ypsilanti's position to more readily rely on new employers who get tax breaks and other concessions not to shut down and stick the town with excess infrastructure and unemployed workers. But this remedy gives municipalities a litigation tool that might give employers grounds f or distrust and that therefore might increase the costs of structuring these deals. An employer that decides to locate or expand and seeks local concessions would have to trust the town not to use the negotiations as a basis of liability when the employer seeks to alter its situation. The employer faces unpredictability concerning, among other things, the length of its commitment to the plant. The employer cannot assume that the court will act only to the extent of enforcing the town's reasonable expectations. The employer might attempt contractually to clarify its commitment, but a court may not enforce the contract literally if it believes that a strict duty is warranted. The employer's other possible responses include moving to a state that does not recognize such fiduciary duties, not asking for concessions that might trigger the duty, or simply foregoing the additional plant investment as unprofitable.
Joint ventures and close corporations
Joint venturers often write contracts varying standard form fiduciary duties for transactions in which the participants plan to pursue independent as well as joint business objectives. Although bargaining for this sort of selfishness might be in both parties' ex ante interests, strict duties based on abstract notions of "trust" and "honor" might frustrate the deal. To be sure, these duties might reduce the costs involved in a venturer's decision to trust the other as compared with relying solely on specific contract terms because open-ended duties prevent venturers from opportunistically taking advantage of their contractual rights. But the strict duty also may increase the parties' joint costs by enabling an opportunistic venturer to extract damages from the other venturer or to use the threat of litigation to renegotiate the deal. 157 See supra text accompanying note 140. The most famous joint venture fiduciary duty case, Meinhard v. Salmon, 161 illustrates the potential for distrust in broad fiduciary duties. The venture involved management of a building for a 20-year term. At the end of the term, the active venturer, Salmon, agreed with the property owner to undertake a much bigger deal that included the subject property without giving Meinhard, the initial financier, an opportunity to join the project. The court held that Salmon breached his fiduciary duty to Meinhard, describing this duty in memorably strong and colorful language. Particularly given the significant difference between the initial and subsequent deals and the fact that Meinhard had recouped his investment many years before, there was ample b asis to dispute the court's result. But what matters most for present purposes is how the holding created distrust in later joint ventures.
Venturers may need to respond to the risks inherent in strict fiduciary duties with contractual devices that limit the risk of opportunistic litigation but increase both parties' costs. The parties might be willing to trust their partners with milder fiduciary duties because of the transaction-cost savings from relying on open-ended default fiduciary duties rather than fully specified contracts. But if, consistent with the strong language in Meinhard, courts apply fiduciary duties strictly and non-contextually in order to ensure a high level of "honor" and "trust," trustors would face a greater risk of bargain-breaking opportunistic litigation. Venturers may need to respond by specifying their rights and responsibilities and explicitly eliminating any broader duty that might apply to unforeseen cases. This might reduce the value of open-ended fiduciary duties, thereby increasing transaction costs and possibly foreclosing productive ventures. If the courts go further and preclude contractual alteration of fiduciary duties, the parties may have to structure their relationships in non-fiduciary terms, thereby losing all the advantages of fiduciary duties, including the potential norm-enhancing effect of fiduciary language in judicial decisions. 162
Non-competition agreements
The increased risk of opportunism associated with regulation need not relate to litigation. The problem arises whenever regulation creates rights that impede parties' ability to protect themselves from others' opportunism. For example, although noncompetition clauses in employment agreements arguably invite employers to treat trapped employees opportunistically, 163 they also protect firms from employees' appropriation of clients or information. Enforcing these clauses lets a software firm, for example, share proprietary information with its employees without being concerned that the employees will start new firms based on the information they learn. This is particularly important for relatively inexperienced employees who have not developed reputations for trustworthiness and who most need the firm's contacts and information. At the same time, employees m ay be able to rely on established firms' reputations not to abuse their power under non-competition agreements. Thus, non-enforcement of the non-competition clause might leave the employer vulnerable to employee opportunism without providing much 161 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) . 162 See supra text accompanying note 71. additional protection to employees. The employee may seize on non-enforceability to take more from the relationship than the parties had bargained for. This may force a costly response from the employer, such as restructuring the employee's responsibilities or client contacts.
B. UNDERMINING TRUST-CREATION
In addition to creating opportunities for distrust, regulation can undermine the creation of trust. As discussed in Part II, the distinct concept of trust requires voluntary subjection to risk, or vulnerability. Legal coercion of faithful behavior therefore reduces the opportunities for trust to develop. Thus, legal coercion not only is irrelevant to the creation of trust, but also can cause a substitution of costly legal constraints for relatively friction-free strong-form and semi-strong-form trust. This general point has four main applications: disposition to trust in personal relationships and otherwise; trust norms; reputation and other forms of semi-strong-form trust, and trust-building associations.
Disposition to trust
Regulation can impede the development of the sort of "strong-form" trust that arises from a disposition to trust in personal relationships or otherwise. 164 First, regulation decreases the sense of vulnerability that is critical to personal trust. This is supported by theories and evidence that extrinsic motivations such as monetary rewards and regulation "crowd out" parties' intrinsic motivations based on benevolence or trust. 165 Thus, strict tax laws, lower speed limits and higher sanctions for crime and tighter regulation of agents may have perverse effects in discouraging voluntary tax compliance, more responsible driving and compliance with law and less trustworthy agents. 166 Second, regulation can interfere with the disposition to trust b y forcing predispute planning. To be sure, if the parties can trust each other not to cheat, they may be able to trust each other not to sue. But opportunistic use of legal remedies does not carry the same connotation as fraud and therefore tempts even r elatively honest actors. Increasing the potential for litigation and administrative complaints increases the need for contracts that minimize the risk of such costly actions. This invites the parties to take an adversarial planning posture that is inconsistent with the nature of personal relationships. These contracts, like the regulation itself, may "crowd out" intrinsic motivations to trust and be trustworthy. 167 Third, mandatory regulation can reduce the parties' ability to form personal relationships based on strong-form trust by eliminating opportunities to signal readiness 164 
See supra subpart II(A)-(B).
165 See Bruno S. Frey, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY 8, 17-8 (1997) (noting generally crowding out effect of regulation). 166 See id. at 49-52, 81, 101. to engage in such relationships. Blair & Stout note that participants in close corporations may decline to use detailed contracts in order to signal their willingness to be vulnerable and therefore to be trustworthy, thereby facilitating selection of trustworthy partners. 168 But mandatory rules reduce the opportunities for such signals. The increased need for pre-dispute planning discussed immediately above may further decrease signaling by increasing the cost of vulnerability and therefore of giving the signal. 169 Fourth, regulation can erode personal trust when disputes arise. Regulation that establishes legal and administrative remedies may interfere with the trust repair process in Lewicki & Bunker's model of the evolution of strong form trust. 170 Lewicki & Bunker assert that breaches of trust in the final, strong-form, stage may be difficult to repair because they carry emotional weight. Instead of the victim's confronting the violator, the latter must admit responsibility, after which the parties renegotiate and the victim accepts reasonable reparations. But in a heavily legalized context, parties submitting to a trust repair process may forego their legal rights by admitting fault or delaying prosecution. Thus, given more law, the parties may be better off standing on their legal rights than trusting their partners.
Trust norms
Strong-form trust can arise from a norm of trustworthiness, 171 which might be established by strong language in judicial decisions. 172 If legal liability backs the norms and judicial language, it removes parties' opportunity to behave according to trusting and trustworthiness norms. Parties will seem to be reliable only because the law forces them be, and believe that they are trusted only because they face these penalties.
One way to describe this phenomenon is that the law changes the "social meaning" of behavior that complies with the norm. Lawrence Lessig has argued that laws against dueling may have changed behavior by changing the meaning of refusing to duel. 173 If dueling is illegal, refusing to duel is not clearly a failure to defend one's honor, but might carry the more favorable connotation of obeying the law and thereby respecting 169 The law's effect may be complicated in this regard by the possibility that increased vulnerability increases the value of the signal when it is given. 170 See supra text accompanying note 54. 171 See supra subpart II(C). 172 See supra text accompanying note 71. 173 See Lessig, supra note 61 (discussing how law can affect the social meaning of behavior).
one's obligation to the community. Laws coercing trustworthy behavior also might change social meaning, but more perversely. The existence of legal coercion means that one no longer can clearly demonstrate that he respects his promise regardless of selfinterest, but rather can show o nly that he can be legally coerced into performing. This makes the other party reluctant to trust without costly constraints. In other words, the meaning of the behavior is changed from the connotation associated with voluntary compliance to the connotation associated with coerced compliance. This inhibits the formation of a norm based on voluntary compliance.
Mandatory rules' perverse effect on norms may cause a downward spiral of trust. As the rules undermine the trust norm, trusting people will decline in number, thereby increasing their risk of dealing with those who do not behave according to trust norms. 174 This will provide a disincentive for this behavior, further decreasing the ranks of the trusting, 175 and further increasing the need for mandatory regulation.
The law may have a related effect in deterring reciprocal altruism by signaling that others will behave in a self-maximizing way. 176 Given this signal, people will not trust out of a desire to avoid being seen as "suckers." 177 This, in turn, may make it harder to establish a trust norm, thereby contributing to the downward spiral of trust.
Reputation and other semi-strong-form trust
To the extent that law imposes a mandatory constraint, it displaces possibilities for private ordering constraints that are more socially valuable than regulation under the logic of trust theory because they substitute trust for friction. Specifically, as discussed in Part III, parties who rely on semi-strong-form trust are willing to risk disappointment rather than insist on the formal and less tailored remedies mandatory regulation supplies. 178 An example is so-called "discretionary" contracts, such as a mutual fund's promise to support the dollar-a-share price, where the fund's reputation rather than a 174 See Bainbridge, supra note 1 at 803.
175 This is analogous to the problem of "mismatch" risk discussed in Paul G. 178 The general point here is that contracts are less binding, and therefore more conducive to trust, than mandatory rules. By contrast, Blair & Stout argue against contract based on a comparison with the absence of all constraints. See supra note 6. contractual remedy backs the promise. 179 Although the fund operator may forfeit some reputation if it fails to honor its promise, it may nevertheless choose to do so if it is facing a serious liquidity crisis. For similar reasons, a manufacturer may express a hope of remaining in the community without intending to be contractually bound or a fiduciary may undertake to deliver the utmost loyalty and care without intending to be subject to liability for imperfection. Courts would frustrate the valuable flexibility such devices provide by making implicit bargains explicit and holding that the parties' expectations necessarily trigger contractual remedies.
Inhibiting private associations
Private associations can contribute to social capital by promoting the willingness to associate. 180 However, regulation can discourage trust-creation by private associations by using these organizations' efforts to increase trust as bases for monitoring obligations. 181 This is part of a general tendency toward emphasizing individual rights at the expense of cooperating in associations. 182 An important context for this regulatory effect is business associations. The parties to a business relationship may contract for control mechanisms and profit-sharing compensation that provide incentives to monitor efficiently. Courts might decide that these contract terms create an agency or partnership relationship even if the contracting parties did not want to create such a relationship. 183 This might trigger both internal fiduciary duties that apply between principal and agent and vicarious liability to third parties. Firms might avoid the agency liability by forming a limited liability business association such as a limited liability company or corporation, but only at the cost of confirming application of fiduciary duties that apply to this type of relationship. 
180
See supra text accompanying notes__.
181 Trust can be eroded by regulation other than that related to generating trust. Legal regulation such as anti-discrimination and anti-trust laws can undermine the exclusivity these organizations need in order to create trust. See Fukuyama, supra note 1 at 315; Bainbridge, supra note 33 at __. For articles dealing with the collision between a individual rights and the "civil society" that private groups help create, see Symposium on Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil Society, 75 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 289 ( 2000). Exclusivity makes it easier for groups to internalize the benefits of creating social capital. First, in small enough groups, members have incentives to forego shortrun self-interest in dealing with other group members because they reasonably expect those others to reciprocate. Second, exclusivity may increase cohesiveness by ensuring that group members share the same values. Consider, for example, Lisa Bernstein's orthodox Jewish diamond dealers. See Bernstein, supra note 57. Third, the power to exclude is a way for the organization to penalize violations of its rules. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law Partner Expulsion, 55 BUS. LAW. 845 (2000) . 182 See Fukuyama, supra note 1; Bainbridge, supra note 1 at 803 (decrying "the decline in social trust [that] began when the rich set of mediating institutions famously praised by Tocqueville was caught, like the Romans at Cannae, between the nanny state on one side and judicial hijacking of the state's monopoly on the use of coercive force to advance a hyper-legalistic cult of the autonomous individual on the other" (footnotes omitted)).
Although these liability rules may make it easier for third parties to rely on the legal "firm," they do so at the potential cost of encouraging the contracting parties to avoid the contractual monitoring mechanisms that triggered the creation of the agency relationship. 184
VI. TRUST, LAW AND THE INTERNET
The Internet is an important context for considering the role of regulation in creating trust because it does not yet have a fixed regulatory structure. At first glance it would seem that, since participants deal with other remotely and potentially anonymously, consumers would be reluctant to rely on web merchants without strong legal rules. It is harder for consumers to rely on merchants when they m ust give up a credit card number and wait for delivery, than when they walk into a brick-and-mortar store and walk out with their goods.
An important trust issue emerging in connection with the Internet is the current debate over Internet privacy. Merchants can acquire valuable marketing information about customers' preferences through techniques such as placing files known as "cookies" on the computers of consumers who visit their websites. 185 Thus, consumers may need protection not only regarding what they buy, but also concerning the information about themselves that they sell or give away. 186 The current Internet regulatory regime relies on semi-strong form trust --that is, on self-imposed and contractual constraints. Web merchants can employ many strategies to encourage consumers to rely on them, including third-party control and monitoring by organizations such as Ernst & Young 187 or TRUSTe, 188 reputational bonding, giving 185 See generally, Federal Trade Commission, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, 2 (available online at www.ftc.gov) (July 1999).
186 Note that it is not clear whether this is really a "privacy" issue involving intrusion, or a property rights issue concerning whether marketing information relating to consumers belongs to consumers or to the merchants who extracted it.
187 For example, a recent advertisement for Ernst & Young touts its verification service as a way for businesses to trust each other and for startups to be trusted by consumers. Ernst & Young's special advertising supplement in the July, 2000 Wired, states in part: "Protect your customers' privacy and transactions or you may be the one who gets burned . . . if your internet customers feel exposed they'll quickly take their business elsewhere. The CyberProcess Certification solutions that we offer, including WebTrust, help you build and maintain their trust. So you can grow your customer base and establish a competitive advantage."
188 For descriptions of this non-profit organization, see FTC Report, supra note 185 at 9-10; and www.truste.org. TRUSTe licensees must abide by TRUSTe's policies concerning collection and use of consumer information, subject to TRUSTe's monitoring and auditing of licensees and resolution, reporting and possible referral to the FTC of consumer complaints. Other private organizations sponsoring consumer privacy efforts include those established by the Better Business Bureau and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. See FTC Report, supra note 185 at 10-12. For an analysis approving use of such private lawmaking regimes in Internet and other commercial law areas, see Gillian K. Hadfield, products away to encourage initial transactions, and building communities through vendor-built discussion groups. 189 The industry also has been developing the so-called "P3P" protocol, which would permit a kind of automated contracting where individuals' computers could block access by firms whose privacy policies do not meet userconfigured standards. 190 As is typically the case without strong regulation, people are vulnerable to some risk of disappointment. Firms might not honor their privacy policies and may be able to exploit chinks in users' privacy protection. Users' vulnerability under the current system has been exposed by several widely publicized incidents of well-known Web retailers' breaching their privacy promises. 191 Accordingly, there have been calls for Internet privacy to move from semi-strong-form trust to a regulatory approach. Although the FTC concluded in a preliminary report on Internet privacy that "legislation to address online privacy is not appropriate at this time," 192 the FTC now seems to be heading away from the self-regulatory approach. 193 1. Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits on the collection of personal data, and such data should be gathered legally, and with the knowledge or consent of the data subjects.
2. Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.
3. Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection, and all subsequent uses should be limited to those purposes. 4. Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for alternative purposes without consent from the data subject or by the authority of law.
5. Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be protected from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.
6. Openness Principle: There should be a general policy of openness about developments in data collection and use. Means should be readily available to ascertain the existence and nature of personal data, the main purpose of their use, and the identity and location of the data controller.
7. Individual Participation Principle: An individual should be able to contact a data controller about what information the controller has about that person, and be able to correct inaccurate records. If an access request is denied, a reason must be given, and the individual must be able to challenge the denial. 8. Accountability Principle: A data controller should be accountable for complying with the measures which give effect to the principles stated above.
Yet, as in the other contexts discussed above, trust in the special sense emphasized in this article does not justify regulation. At best, legal regulation can make it easier for consumers t o rely on merchants. But it does not necessarily follow that regulation is cost-justified, 199 and use of the word "trust" does not further the argument. Regulation cannot create strong-form trust on the Internet anymore than in other areas.
Legal regulation can, however, create distrust. Under a system designed to enable absolute consumer reliance on merchants' privacy policies, web merchants would be subject to potential liability if, for example, they changed some detail of their privacy policy after obtaining information without getting customer consent, or could not adequately document how they used consumer information. If consumers had legal remedies for violation of privacy policies, the damages would be uncertain and potentially open-ended, particularly given the questions concerning the value of personal information to consumers. 200 Contracts would not necessarily protect merchants because weak-form trust assumes non-contractibility of privacy rights. 201 Accordingly, instead of the current freewheeling and rapidly evolving e -commerce, web merchants would be unwilling to deal with consumers except within a rigid regulatory structure that protects them from liability.
Moreover, regulation inhibits the development of trust. Consumers cannot make themselves vulnerable as trust requires, and merchants cannot show themselves to be genuinely trustworthy, under a system of extensive regulation. Legal regulation also interferes with the role of private organizations in internalizing some of the costs of creating social capital that underlies strong-form trust on the Internet. 202 For example, EBay, the online auction firm, provides a way of bringing private buyers and sellers together. The resulting interactions can create reputational information that encourages dealings. 203 Internet service providers such as America Online provide space for online communities. 204 Courts and regulators may undermine these activities by holding that they trigger tort or other liability. For example, E-Bay was sued on the ground that it is, in effect, an auctioneer and therefore liable under a California statute regulating sale of sports memorabilia. 205 Similarly, holding Internet service providers liable for their members' postings 206 would force these firms to internalize the costs of erroneous or defamatory postings although they do not internalize the social benefits of providing an information-exchange mechanism and creating online communities. This could reduce the Internet's potential for creating social capital. 207
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Trust in society is a potentially useful dimension of public policy debate. But this article has shown that trust must be used with care as a justification for regulation. Even if mandatory regulation might increase weak-form reliance on others, this in itself does not provide any new justification for legal coercion. Strong-form trust provided by altruism, norms, personal relationship, and social capital, and semi-strong trust that permits reliance on private ordering, may be useful policy goals because these forms of trust decrease friction and thereby increase social wealth. But law has no effect on trust in this sense. Indeed, mandatory regulation may actually decrease these forms of trust by creating opportunities for distrust and inhibiting trust-creation.
Thus, trust provides another argument in favor of enforcing contracts.
Strong regulation is justified only on the assumption that we live in a Hobbesian world in which short-term self-interest is dominant. This is the world of Terry Gilliam's film "Brazil," awash in law and bureaucracy. Pervasive government signs carry slogans like "trust in haste, repent at leisure" and "don't suspect a friend, report him." Trust in this world is subversive. This is the sort of world that either justifies or results from the strong, mandatory regulation some legal commentators advocate.
These observations bear on trust-creation in contexts such as transition economies or the Internet where questions about the appropriate extent of regulation are most salient. While regulation may induce parties to deal with each other by lowering the risks inherent in these dealings, it also may subvert trust. Moreover, even if regulation is necessary in transition economies, the same considerations obviously do not translate to developed economies. Viewing trust as an increasing function of law may undermine the private structures that developed economies have managed to produce, thereby moving them closer to the transition economies we want to reform. 
